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FOR WORKSHOP: THE INCOMPUTABLE,
at Kavli Royal Society International
Centre Chicheley Hall: 12 - 15 June, 2012
The meta-morphogenesis of virtual machinery with “physically indeﬁnable” functions
I use “meta-morphogenesis” to refer to the mechanisms and processes by which morphogenesis, especially
morphogenesis of information processing functions and mechanisms, changes – over evolutionary,
developmental and social time scales. I shall give a brief presentation of some of the ideas, including
conjectures about how the development of virtual machinery in biological organisms can be compared with
some of the complex, often unnoticed, developments in computing systems over the last six or seven
decades including production of virtual machinery with complex internal causation as well as external and
“downward” causal connections.
Some of that virtual machinery has functions whose description requires language that cannot be translated
into the language of the physical sciences (as currently understood)
E.g. talk of “wanting”, “trying”. “believing”, “inferring”, “introspecting”, “learning”, “planning”, ... cannot be
translated into the language of physics and chemistry (plus mathematics).
This fact could cause future reﬂective machines to become puzzled about their own consciousness and
“mind-brain” (or “mind-machine”) relationships in the same ways as human philosophers and scientists have.
Well-designed tutorials in systems engineering may help to remove the puzzles.
For more information see:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/meta-morphogenesis.html
A draft paper on the creativity of evolution is here:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/evo-creativity.pdf
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These slides are still under construction.
The following pages should be regarded as drafts that will change.
The latest version of the slides will be available here:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#talk102
Some of the other presentations on the same web page are also relevant, as are these
web pages
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/meta-morphogenesis.html
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/toddler-theorems.html
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/beyond-modularity.html
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/evolution-life-mind.html
and my four contributions to
Alan Turing - His Work and Impact,
Eds. S. B. Cooper and J. van Leeuwen
Preprints:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/11.html#1106
Please send comments and suggestions to
Aaron Sloman <a.sloman@cs.bham.ac.uk>
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The history of our planet demonstrates the following:
Starting merely with a rich enough physical/chemical machine, without any external input
apart from solar energy, stellar radiation (especially light), and occasional disruptive
physical perturbations (e.g. asteroid impacts), it is possible to produce every feature of
both natural and artiﬁcial intelligence that has ever been manifested on earth – and
presumably many more, since the processes are continuing; and there are many
branches that could have been taken but were not taken, e.g. what might have happened
if there had not been highly disruptive asteroid impacts, or if there had been different
impacts at different times.
So, a sufﬁciently large and complex, multi-component, knowledge-free physicochemical
machine is capable of producing every sort of intelligence, and every sort of product of
intelligence, that has so far turned up on earth, without needing an external teacher or
programmer, though it may take a very long time and require a huge amount of
parallelism to allow effects of competition and cooperation to play a major role, and also
to allow high level requirements to feed back into very low-level designs (e.g. adding
neural computation to chemical computation, and also extending chemical computation
by selecting more complex forms that serve higher level needs).
Results include Euclid’s elements, the idea of a Universal Turing Machine, proofs of
incomputability and undecidability, sonnets, plays, paintings, symphonies, skyscrapers,
airliners, bombs, democracies, dictatorships, wars, pandemics, and these slides.
How? Can a Turing machine do all that?
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The universe contains
Matter
Energy
Information
(Semantic information, not Shannon information)
All life involves use of information in using and controlling matter, energy
and information (Note the educational implications).
Many aspects of how information is acquired and used, and what is
achieved by its use, grow over time – as a result of evolution and its
products, including mechanisms of learning and development.
NOTES:
 Products of biological evolution include microbes, termites, termite cathedrals, beaver
dams, Euclid’s elements, Beethoven’s quartets, and computers.
 Many of the products cannot be described in the language of physics even though they
are fully implemented in the language of physics: a wide-spread kind of “emergence”.
 Many of those “irreducable” products cause physical effects: “downward causation”.
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I’ll present an idea, that could help to bring different kinds of research together in fruitful
cooperation.
The idea is that many of the developments in biological evolution that are so far not
understood, and in some cases have gone unnoticed, were concerned with changes in
information processing.
Changes in individual development and learning, as well as evolutionary processes, can
produce new forms of information processing.
Examples include:
Developing new sensors and new sensory-processing systems
developing new effectors (motors) and new motor-control systems
learning new ways to learn
development of new forms of development
evolution of new types of evolution
evolution of new types of learning
evolution of new forms of development
development of new forms of learning
new forms of learning supporting new forms of evolution
Evolution of culture....
More details follow, but still too sketchy.
The following table merely presents a small sample of information-processing capabilities in organisms –
without any claims about ordering or how many intermediate stages need to be identiﬁed for a complete
account.
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New forms of representation and ontologies. Coping with relations, and changing relations
Ontologies for scalar types, partial orderings,
taxonomies, n-ary relationships, process-types,
dispositions, powers, causes...
Somatic (e.g. sensorymotor) and exosomatic
ontologies (including enduring particulars not
reducible to sensorymotor invariants).
Conditional control On-line vs. off-line intelligence (e.g. predict, plan)
Using on-line and off-line intelligence concurrently Meta-semantic competences and ontologies
Specifying functions rather than behaviours, mech-
anisms or other implementation details
Duplicate then differentiate vs abstraction using
parametrization (in genome, in learning)
Use of virtual machinery (a) to emulate physical
machinery (b) for novel purposes
Facing new requirements for virtual machinery, and
proliferating types (e.g. dedicated vs platform VMs)
Representing not only the actual, but also the
possible, and constraints on possibilities (i.e.
affordances).
Motivational and deliberative competences (Meta-
management (Beaudoin, 1994))
Transitions in representational requirements (often
different uses of the same information require
different representations – used in parallel)
“Peep-hole” vs “Multi-window” perception and
action: Input and output streams interpreted or
used at different levels of abstraction concurrently.
Processes of re-representation and systematization
of old information (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992).
Empirical learning vs working things out
Self-monitoring at a VM level, extending meta-
management
Precocial/Altricial tradeoffs in development
(Chappell & Sloman, 2007)
From internal languages to communicative lan-
guages (Sloman, 2008a)
New forms of meta-morphogenesis, e.g. cultural
Many changes escape notice because people assume that what organisms can do is obvious and all that is
needed is to explain how it is done. Then explanations and models are produced that turn out inadequate.
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 Specifying functions rather than behaviours or mechanisms
How can evolution do this? Or DNA??
 What we have learnt about virtual machinery.
– Old idea: convenient alternative to hardware
– New idea: intrinsic extension to computational (information processing) repertoire.
 Specifying, describing, debugging, VMs (done by evolution, or by engineers)
 Platform VMs vs Application VMs
 Self-monitoring VMs.
 Causation in VMs: networks of concurrently interacting VM subsystems, with various
links to the environment. Including “downward” causation, e.g. in a compiler
 Expanded forms of control, including control of control, development of new forms of
control, formation and use of abstract policies, ...
 Use of VMs allows more rapid development in individuals (why?)
 Use of VMs allows more rapid evolution at species level (why?)
 What happens when self monitoring VMs attempting to understand their environment,
start trying to understand themselves and others like themselves?
 They will become philosophers: probably muddled philosophers if they understand only
physical mechanisms.
E.g. this will lead to bad theories of qualia. Compare (Sloman, 2010b).
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It’s a huge project, barely started
One way to think about it (generalising Turing’s ideas on morphogenesis? (Turing, 1952)):
 Evolution is not a blind watchmaker, it’s a blind theorem prover/discoverer
 The theorems are about what forms of machinery, including information processing
machinery, can exist in a physical universe
 The derivations are evolutionary and developmental trajectories.
 The rules of inference employed are not ﬁxed: new ones are produced as a result of
applications old ones (hence the “meta-”).
 The new ones can add power to the system – extending what can be produced and
speed of production.
 The evolution and development of human mathematical capabilities (with pre-cursors in
other animals) is one of the most important aspects of this process – so far.
Examples of “toddler theorems”(Sloman, 2008b)
 We still understand very little about this.
The work of Annette Karmiloff-Smith on “Representational Redescription” is
an important contribution. (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) cf. (Craik, 1943)
Each of these topics requires more time than I have left.
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Despite many impressive achievements of computer scientists, computer systems
engineers, roboticists, application developers and even malware developers, we are
nowhere near building machines that match the capabilities of nest-building birds, hunting
animals and their prey, octopuses, cetaceans, elephants, and primates, including human
toddlers.
(Although in many areas computer systems obviously surpass the abilities of all animals including humans).
I suggest that the gap has two main causes:
(a) inadequate understanding of the achievements of biological evolution, leading to over-simpliﬁed
characterisations of
– the problems,
– the roles of various environments, and
– the diversity of what needs to be explained
(which in turn leads to misguided factional warfare in AI and Cognitive science);
(b) an inadequate repertoire of conceptual tools for thinking about possible explanatory mechanisms
(including varieties of requirements, forms of representation, types of ontology, computational
mechanisms, architectures, and types of development).
I propose a way of thinking about (a) and (b) that could provide a unifying framework for
diverse researchers (including philosophers) to collaborate:
viewing many different capabilities, and mechanisms supporting them, as products of different stages of
meta-morphogenesis (including evolutionary, developmental, and social/cultural processes).
Discussions of these ideas can be found here:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/meta-morphogenesis.html
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/beyond-modularity.html
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to be processed, the uses of the information, and the means
of processing have varied enormously, between the earliest
microbes and sophisticated modern animals.
Evolution isn’t just a uniform process in which natural selection uses random chemical
changes:
Many different things can inﬂuence evolution, including
 What’s in the environment
Physical structures and processes, which vary across the planet and at different times.
Other information-processing systems – prey, predators, competitors, conspeciﬁcs, offspring, ...
 Products of previous evolution
Previous physical developments and previous computational developments in the species, or in other
species.
These provide new requirements – e.g. new requirements to control articulated body parts, or to get
the most beneﬁt from new sensory mechanisms.
They also provide new opportunities: new platforms for further development.
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Types of environment with different information-processing requirements
What information processing mechanisms could be useful in the following epochs?
 Microbes in a chemical soup
 Microbes in a soup with detectable chemical gradients
 Soup plus some stable structures (places with good stuff, bad stuff, obstacles, supports, shelters)
 Things in the environment that have to be manipulated to be eaten (e.g. disassembled)
 Organisms with controllable manipulators - for eating, building, ﬁghting...
(products of previous evolution: providing new opportunities for information-based control)
 Food/prey/predators/mates with detectable aromas (more chemical information bearers)
 Environments with food that tries to escape (prey).
 Organisms in environments with things that try to eat them (predators).
 Environments with and without places to hide from predators
 Environments with and without places for prey to hide
 Prey, predators, collaborators, whose behaviour can reveal intentions, interests, knowledge...
 Mates with preferences
 Competitors for food and mates
 Collaborators that need, or can supply, information.
 and so on .....
Can we analyse the changes in information processing capabilities made useful/possible
by the above changes, so as to form a collection of “dependency trees” showing possible
evolutionary and developmental trajectories?
(A sort of generalisation of Turing’s 1952 paper on physical morphogenesis?)
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 How do the information-processing requirements change across these
cases (microbes, insects, vertebrates .... in various environments)?
Identifying the changing niche-pressures can be very hard, but by trying to design
working models of the organisms, and ﬁnding the problems we can discover some.
 How can we learn to see what problems young children and other
animals are encountering?
Often, problems, and opportunities, only become visible when you try to build a
machine to do what the animal or infant does.
We (adults) can also make ourselves a bit like younger learners by putting ourselves
in new situations where we play, then discover new structures and regularities
E.g. in activities proposed in (Sauvy & Sauvy, 1974).
E.g. see the puzzles in http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#toddler
 It’s hard to notice the right questions to ask about what is learnt.
Noticing behavioural changes may not tell us what forms of perception and thinking
led to the change: e.g. perceiving and reasoning about affordances (possibilities and
constraints), deliberating about what to do, remembering, ... (Sloman, 2011c, 2006)
 How do the phenomena of self-awareness (including qualia as contents
of consciousness) ﬁt into this framework?
I think the answer is connected with evolution of species that grow virtual machinery,
including virtual machines for self-monitoring and self-control.
But that’s another talk. http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#talk95
An explanation for the ineffability of qualia is suggested in (Sloman & Chrisley, 2003)
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There’s a huge amount of research on trying to get robots to walk, run, pick
things up, go smoothly through doorways, move so as to avoid obstacles.
Those are important, non-trivial research targets relevant to explaining the behaviour of
many types of animal, including insects, ﬁshes, birds, squirrels, grazing mammals, etc.
The ability to control real time interaction with an environment could be called “on-line” intelligence:
it requires a lot of information to be continually acquired through sensors (including haptic and
proprioceptive receptors, and in some cases the vestibular system – semi-circular canals), stored
transiently and used in feedback control. The information is continually replaced during and after use.
There are other uses to which information about the environment can be put, which requires information
acquired to be stored for longer times, and to be integrated with other stored information.
One example is incrementally storing and integrating metrical and or topological information acquired while
moving around in the environment, about places, routes, space occupants, obstacles etc..
This is called SLAM, “Simultaneous Localisation and Mapping”.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simultaneous localization and mapping
Online control needs different mechanisms from deliberative control, detecting and
reasoning about affordances, formulating goals, making plans to achieve the goals,
executing the plans, and evaluating progress.
Much of the functionality of deliberative mechanisms produces only internal changes, without any
external movement or action. See (Sloman, 2006) and
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#gibson
This has implications regarding functions of vision, which are misunderstood by many.
A visual system that merely labels recognized objects, or merely builds a model of what’s in the
environment does not necessarily understand what is in the model nor what the implications are.
Incomputable Workshop June 2012 Slide 14 Last revised: June 19, 2012Varieties of visual/cognitive competences
Conjecture:
Widespread animal abilities to perceive and reason about affordances, and to form
intentions, discover plans, and store those plans, seem to be precursors to the human
ability to discover and reason about mathematical properties of space and time.
See
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#gibson
What’s vision for, and how does it work? From Marr (and earlier) to Gibson and Beyond.
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#toddler
Why (and how) did biological evolution produce mathematicians?
If learning mathematics requires a teacher, where did the ﬁrst teachers come from?
And also precursors to human language
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#glang
Currently there are no good working models of these phenomena.
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Forms of biological information processing that exist now are products of
biological information processing over many stages of evolution and
development, including cultural evolution in the case of humans.
 Some forms of information processing are concerned only with online control of
interactions with the immediate sensed environment (Only sensorymotor processing)
 Simple organisms can represent only their own sensor and motor signals and internal
states: they use only somatic semantics. Others can refer beyond the skin, using
exosomatic semantic contents.
 Some exosomatic contents refer only to physical objects, properties, relations,
processes, states of affairs, etc. (Including physical objects that happen to be organisms.)
 Some exosomatic contents refer to the past, the future, remote locations, invisible
entities, insides of things (e.g. kinds of material). (When are these useful??)
 Others have meta-semantic competences they can refer to things that refer and the
contents referred to:
This requires the ability to deal with “referential opacity”, “intensionality”, etc.
(“Theory of mind” studies in developmental psychology refer to special cases (Apperly, 2010).)
Some of these competences involve reference to the individual’s own contents
(self-awareness of perceptual, thinking, reasoning, motivational states and processes)
 Some individuals can do only Humean causal reasoning – using associations,
correlations, statistics, probabilities – what always or usually happens.
 Some can do Kantian causal reasoning: using the ability to work out what must
happen? – An important aspect of human development. (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Sloman, 2008c)
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Topics for further investigation (a few examples):
 some of the ways nature can be interrogated, e.g.
– perceiving
– acting while perceiving (e.g. exploring, probing, testing)
– getting information from others who have already acquired information
– combining information acquired in different places, at different times, in different ways. How?
 some of the kinds of information that can be acquired by such interrogation, e.g.
– about what particular things and what types of things exist in the environment
– about possibilities for change and limitations of possibilities (what can and what cannot happen)
– about the directly accessible portions of the environment
– about remote places, past events, future events
– generalisations about what happens under what conditions (laws)
– limitations and beneﬁts of particular forms of representation
– the need to modify or extend current ontologies – notions of what can exist (Sloman, 1978, Ch 2)
 some of the things that can be done with the information, e.g.
– achieving practical goals (controlling actions, changing the environment, including online control)
– formulating new kinds of theory and new kinds of goal
– understanding causation and making correct predictions
– explaining WHY things are as they are, in two ways:
o Deriving consequences from theories about hypothesised mechanisms (including testing)
o Investigating limits of what is possible in a world for which a certain form of representation is
appropriate (e.g. a certain sort of geometry, a certain kind of logic).
 Information-processing architectures, mechanisms, and forms of representation are
required for all this to work (Including architectures that grow themselves.)
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Philosophers tend to distinguish propositions, which are capable of being
true or false, from concepts, which are neither, but can be combined to form
true or false (or in some cases incoherent) propositions (questions, etc.)
 Concepts are combinable meaning-fragments used for expressing semantic contents:
motor signals, sensor information, thoughts, questions, commands, intentions, plans, theories,
predictions, explanations, stories, ... (depending on type of organism)
The concepts “horse” and “ant” are neither true nor false, whereas “Every full grown horse is bigger
than every ant” is true, and “An ant can swallow a horse” is false.
 We tend to assume that all concepts used by humans correspond to words or phrases
in human languages, but an individual can use non-verbal meaning fragments, for
example, in percepts or action control.
E.g. before a cat jumps from the ground to rest on a narrow wall, she needs to take in information
about how high the wall is, how it is related to her starting location, how wide the top surface is, in
which direction the wall is, where it wishes to end up, what kind of force it needs to exert on the ground
and how quickly, etc. Cats certainly cannot express all that in a communicative language but they must
encode the information in some form internally in order to be able to use it, in deciding to jump, and
deciding how to jump, etc. The information they use need not be expressible in English.
 The set of concepts (recombinable meaning fragments) and forms of meaning
composition used by an individual implicitly specify sets of possible entities, states,
processes, causal interactions, generalisations, etc. to which the individual has access:
the concepts available determine the ontology usable by the individual, i.e. the implicitly
presupposed theory about what sorts of things can exist.
 We know very little about the kinds of meaning fragments, or ontologies most species
(including humans) have access to, nor how they vary between individuals, or over time.
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Different organisms are capable of referring to different things.
 What they refer to may not be expressible using human language, but there is a clear
difference between what a new chick can look for and react to (food to peck, a hen to
imprint on), and a new foal, which somehow struggles to support itself on four legs,
then ﬁnds and sucks a mare’s nipples – or runs with the herd if attacked:
These species clearly access and use different kinds of environmental information.
 How does this differ from the information their evolutionary precursors were able to
acquire, represent, store, manipulate and use?
Can we identify the ontological and representational transitions?
 Evolution produces representational differences across generations or species;
Learning and development change meaning capabilities within individuals. How?
The information a human neonate can represent seems to be very different from what an adult
carpenter, historian, violinist, mathematician, athlete, programmer or quantum physicist can represent.
What changes, and how? Not all species have so much potential for conceptual change in individuals.
 Concepts are meaning fragments that can be combined in different ways to form goals,
questions, plans, hypotheses, intentions, predictions, control signals etc. In humans
(and which other species?), information contents developed later are richer, more
varied, and more complex than those available to neonates.
Research question: how many different sorts of minimal meaning unit are used in organisms, and in
how many different ways can they be combined to form larger meaning units?
 What happens when individuals acquire new “meaning units” – new concepts?
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“Trivial” ontological extensions introduce new terms deﬁnable in terms of
old ones (E.g. A pentagon is a polygon with ﬁve sides.)
Use of explicitly deﬁned concepts allows nothing new to be expressed: though mode of expression may be
much more economical and much easier to understand.
“Non-trivial” ontological extensions introduce terms that are not explicitly deﬁnable.
E.g. Newton’s concept of mass, the concept of a gene, an animal’s concepts of 3-D objects or object
fragments that can exist independently of whether and how they are perceived, a child’s concepts of the
kinds of stuff of which objects are composed, etc.
Often such concepts are not deﬁnable in terms of sensory and/or motor signals, since they don’t refer to
contents of such signals, but to external causes. They are exo-somatic, often a-modal, concepts.
Concepts of spatial location, distance, size, orientation, adjacency, straightness, containment, causation,
and other spatio-temporal concepts necessary for representing and reasoning about our world are all
exo-somatic: they refer to what’s outside the perceiver’s body.
Including concepts used by robots in SLAM: Simultaneous Localisation and Mapping
New terms are often implicitly deﬁned by the theories that use them, but not totally deﬁned
by those theories. (Sloman, 2007)
So theories and modes of observation and measurement can change while old concepts remain in use,
slightly modiﬁed by the altered theoretical content. (Cohen, 1962)
A child or animal learning to think about things that exist independently of being perceived
or acted on uses an ontology not deﬁnable in terms of patterns in its sensorymotor signals.
I.e. an exosomatic ontology referring to things in the environment.
(Concept empiricism and “symbol grounding” theory erroneously assume this is impossible. (Sloman, 2007))
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 Trivial ontological extensions merely introduce new labels deﬁned in
terms of old ones – enabling nothing new to be expressed, although
economy of expression may be increased usefully.
Example: An organism with sensors that detect changes in pressure and changes in
light intensity, and can represent co-occurrence, might ﬁnd it useful to label events
when pressure increases and intensity decreases, e.g. as “ZZZZ” events.
That abbreviation does not extend what it can perceive, think about, reason about, learn about,
compared with using old labels for pressure and intensity changes, with conjunction.
But (like scientists) if it can invent new concepts that are not deﬁnable in terms of old ones, it
may be able to express explanatory theories that were previously inexpressible (and so unthinkable),
and also formulate questions that drive investigation of the environment. (Sloman, 2007)
Such an organism, (using abductive mechanisms provided by evolution) might
postulate the existence of external entities which it labels “ZZZZs” and which, when
approached closely, can cause tactile pressure to increase while illumination
decreases. It could then formulate tasks of ﬁnding out where ZZZZs are located,
whether they move around, where they come from, what other effects they have, how
big they are, whether they are edible, whether they are dangerous, etc.
The concept of a ZZZZ would then be an exosomatic concept, unlike the somatic concepts of
sensed pressure and sensed illumination, which refer only to states of the perceiver’s sensors.
 Using exosomatic concepts, allows organisms to refer to things outside
them, instead of only their own sensory states and their correlations.
Some can then develop models theories, beliefs, percepts, questions, plans, and
goals referring deep into the environment, to the past, the future, remote places...
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The ﬁrst exosomatic ontologies were probably produced by evolution,
E.g. mobile organisms that construct primitive maps recording spatial occupancy, and
organisms that manipulate small objects to learn about the objects rather than about its
own sensorimotor correlations, use exosomatic ontologies.
Later on, mechanisms evolved that enabled individuals to create their own
ontologies triggered by interacting with the environment, and in some cases
with one another.
Are humans genetically predisposed to develop a concept of space indeﬁnitely extended
in all directions, or is that somehow a response to interacting with an ever-expanding
local environment?
What mechanisms and forms of representation could enable such ontological creativity?
Compare: John McCarthy, “The well-designed child”. (McCarthy, 2008) (Compare (Sloman, 2008c))
Later still, ontologies were transmitted explicitly within a culture, especially
to young learners – enormously speeding up ontology development.
NB: such transmission cannot all be based on explicit deﬁnition.
It may require stimulating learners to create their own explanatory theories.
(Conscious or unconscious scaffolding.)
See also (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992), and:
The Computer Revolution in Philosophy, 1978. Now online, revised, especially chapter 2.
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/crp/
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Those powers to extend concepts beyond sensory-motor contents (beyond
somatic concepts) appear to have produced
 Concepts of kind of matter, with different properties (e.g. rigidity, ﬂexibility (of different
kinds), elasticity, viscosity, ...).
 Concepts of kinds of structural relationship
– topological
– metrical
– causal
– functional
 Concepts of different kinds of agency
– physical forces (levers, gravity)
– chemical processes (decomposition, combustion)
– biological control (growth, repair, homeostasis)
– reactive behaviours (innate or acquired reﬂexes)
– deliberative capabilities (using hypothetical reasoning, searching)
– meta-semantic capabilities (referring to things that refer)
– concepts of kinds of merit, value, goodness, badness
Compare developments in computer systems engineering.
We need careful study of actual and possible representational and conceptual
trajectories and changes in competence, in biological evolution; along with changes
in individuals and cultures.
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It’s important to consider many different sorts of animal competence,
including competence-changing competences.
 Some are closely related to the structure of the immediate physical environment.
 As organisms become more complex, the requirements for change depend on
both their existing morphology and competences
and the environment (which may include other information-processors)
 The features of virtual machinery that make design, monitoring, control debugging more
tractable for human engineers, may also have inﬂuenced biological virtual machinery.
 Self-monitoring, reﬂective, machines may reach incorrect conclusions about what they
are and how they work (e.g. reinventing old philosophical mind/body theories)
 There’s a large amount of research on embodied cognition that assumes all
intelligence, including learning, is concerned with patterns in sensory-motor signals:
this ignores the need for some organisms and robots to use exosomatic ontologies.
 How to control development of exosomatic ontologies is a hard problem: there may be
evolved constraints that limit the environments in which we can do this.
“Symbol grounding” (concept empiricism) is a serious error, refuted by Kant, and philosophers of science.
 The ability of older individuals to help younger ones learn can speed up evolution –
cultural evolution. Preceded in evolution by self-debugging and self-extension?
 Humans (and some others) have forms of development not yet modelled in AI, e.g.
precursors of mathematical competences. (I have some rough ideas)
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For any of the above biological changes B1, B2, etc. and for any
environmental change E, there can be inﬂuences of the forms
 E changes B
Some stable structures (e.g. food sources) in the environment make controlled locomotion, exploratory
movements and spatial memory useful – e.g. acquiring and using a terrain map
 B changes E
New microbes can change earth’s atmosphere, providing opportunities for lungs to be useful. Animals
consuming plants can produce deserts, changing requirements for viability – e.g. ﬁnding buried food.
 Bi changes Bj
Evolution of articulated manipulators provides opportunities for evolution of new perceptual and control
mechanisms – e.g. using information about positions and relations of effectors and other objects.
 Ei changes Ej
Volcanic eruptions can lead to cloud blankets shutting out solar radiation, leading to glaciation ....
Mutually orchestrated parallel inﬂuences
Combinations of Ei, Bj, ... inﬂuence changes in others
 in evolution (across generations – changes in niches, and in designs – genomes)
 in individuals (over time)
 in societies
 in ecosystems
Understanding and modelling these concurrent mutually interacting changes and their
inﬂuences on evolution of new forms of information-processing is a long term challenge.
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Things that cause changes can produce new things that cause
changes – eventually creating huge differences from early examples.
Old goals may be achieved in new ways
Effects can include both new kinds of information acquired and new ways of acquiring
and using information: contents, functions and mechanisms can change.
(Try to think of examples of each kind of inﬂuence.)
New information-processing mechanisms can produce new biological phenomena
Organisms that can monitor and modulate their own information processing, in new ways
Contrast feedback loops where information is transient and used transiently (e.g. homeostasis,
servo-control) with building re-usable information records (e.g. records of structural and causal
relationships and changes)
Examples needed of
Organisms that can discover what they have learnt, and use that to change some of their reasoning.
Organisms that discover that they have made discoveries
Organisms that can communicate what they have discovered
Organisms that can debug their conclusions, their reasoning, their forms of representation, their
mis-uses of information...
Organisms that make and use predictions about new phenomena. (Craik, 1943; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992)
Organisms that can reason about perception, inference, and learning in others. (Apperly, 2010)
Instead of “organisms” substitute “societies” or “cultures”:
Compare the history of information-processing science and technology especially over the last century.
(Dyson, 1997)
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I’ll show some examples of transitions that include major reorganisation of
some body of knowledge, introducing new concepts and theories that could
not be derived from the transport mechanisms used.
Some of these reorganisations seem to be examples of what Annette Karmiloff-Smith
called “Representational Redescription”. See Karmiloff-Smith (1992).
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/beyond-modularity.html
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/toddler-theorems.html
Some examples of discovery involving something like “Representational redescription”
follow.
It’s not clear when this happens in humans – perhaps far more often than anyone realises.
This could be part of the explanation of human mathematical competences.
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There is currently much discussion of computing education in schools and this is leading to
major new developments, including less emphasis on teaching students to use existing
software tools (ICT) and more emphasis on teaching students to design and implement
their own working systems (Software Engineering).
At present most of the educational emphasis is on engineering (making and doing), not
science (understanding how the world works and building models to demonstrate and test
our theories and explanations).
That emphasis is justiﬁed by the shortage of applicants for computer science degree
courses, and the shortage of well qualiﬁed applicants for IT jobs in industry.
All of that is important, but in the long term it is just as important to educate youngsters to
use computational ideas in trying to understand how things work, e.g. how animals
perceive, learn, act, communicate; how biological evolution works; how social and
economic systems work; how diseases like cancer work, and how child learning develops.
These scientiﬁc goals are all concerned with information processing systems. Learning to
think about such systems after leaving school is too late, like learning play a violin only
after leaving school.
So we must ensure that not just our future engineers but also our future scientists and
other thinkers are intellectually equipped for the task of understanding existing complex
information-processing systems, not only building new ones that are useful or fun.
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This talk presents a subset of themes from an ambitious long-term
multi-disciplinary research project.
 The universe contains matter, energy, and information.
For a partial answer to “What is information?” see Sloman (2011b).
Like the concepts “matter”, and “energy”, “information” cannot be deﬁned explicitly without circularity.
NB “Information” is not used here in Shannon’s (syntactic) sense, but the ordinary sense: information
is about something, actual or possible.
It’s not explicitly deﬁnable, but (mostly) implicitly deﬁned by our theories about information.
 Information, like matter and energy, is usable, in different ways:
The key use is for control – control of physical processes or control of information processing.
(Often the potential use does not produce actual use – for various reasons.)
 The variety of types of information and types of use and inﬂuence, have been steadily
increasing as a result of biological evolution:
it produces new users, with new needs, new capabilities, new ways of acquiring and using information.
It can also produce new predators, new prey, new competitors for resources, and new collaborators, ...
All of this depends on new mechanisms, including new information-processing mechanisms.
 For the earliest organisms almost all information processing was molecular (chemical)
– there were no brains or nerves.
Chemical (molecular) information processing remains important for all life, including building brains.
We probably don’t yet understand the full potential of chemical information processing.
 We still have much to understand about ways in which information-processing changed,
over millions of years, and in shorter periods.
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I don’t use the word “information” in the sense of Shannon, but the much
older sense that refers to meaning, or semantic content:
Information
 can be true or false
 can be inconsistent
 can be tautologous
 can be derived from other information
 can be used as a basis for deriving additional information
 can specify questions, goals, preferences, policies, plans
 can be used to generate or control actions
 cannot be deﬁned (except implicitly by the theories in which it plays a role).
(Sloman, 2011b)
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 Despite many advances, we still understand only a small subset of what
sorts of information-processing can occur.
We have learnt about a subset of
– types of information content
E.g. in animal vision
See http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#gibson
– types of information bearer (forms of representation)
– types of information manipulation
(construction, derivation, comparison, analysis, storage, retrieval, application, ...).
– types of information processing mechanism (natural and man-made).
– types of multi-mechanism information processing architecture
– types of self-constructing, self-monitoring, self-modifying information processing
architecture
– types of virtual machinery (including “layered” virtual machines).
Computer systems engineers have learnt about and developed many different types of virtual
machinery and mechanisms to support them and their interactions: some running on a single
computer, some distributed over networks, with various kinds of interconnection with other
machines or with the physical environment or underlying physical mechanisms (e.g. mechanisms
supporting “virtual” memories.
I conjecture that biological evolution “discovered” the need much earlier, and produced many
types of virtual machinery, including human minds. (Sloman, 2010a, 2011a)
There’s much work to be done by future researchers – I’ll try to give some pointers.
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 All of this biological diversity depends on the underlying combinatorial
richness of the physical world, at many levels.
E.g. sub-atomic, atomic, molecular, in organisms, in ecosystems, in social systems, ...
 Although much has been learnt about physical substances, physical structures,
physical processes, types of physical interaction, ... we are still in the early stages of
learning about ways in which physical structures and processes can be related to types
of information-processing, including information-processing in virtual machinery.
See (Sloman, 2011b), and
UK Grand Challenge 7: http://www.bcs.org/content/conMediaFile/9556
 Most human-made information processing systems (especially during the last half
century) make use only of streams of discrete changes in collections of switches (and
other bi-stable, or multi-stable, devices),
 In contrast, biological information processing systems seem to use far more varied
mechanisms supported by physical matter and physical processes (including different
types of virtual machinery).
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 We now already know far more about information processing systems
than scientists and philosophers did at the time of Darwin:
He was unable to answer some of his strongest critics – but we can give new
answers, that are not yet widely understood – and are ignored by most philosophers.
This can be used to shed new light on some very old problems about the nature of
mind, self-consciousness and mind-body relationships. Sloman (2010a)
E.g. since the 1940s, the notion of non-physical machinery, virtual machinery, that can do things has
developed far more sophistication than most people have noticed
 NOTE:
Ada Lovelace understood some of this a century before Turing.
She wrote in 1842:
“The operating mechanism can even be thrown into action independently of any object to operate upon
(although of course no result could then be developed). Again, it might act upon other things besides
number, were objects found whose mutual fundamental relations could be expressed by those of the
abstract science of operations, and which should be also susceptible of adaptations to the action of the
operating notation and mechanism of the engine. Supposing, for instance, that the fundamental
relations of pitched sounds in the science of harmony and of musical composition were susceptible of
such expression and adaptations, the engine might compose elaborate and scientiﬁc pieces of music
of any degree of complexity or extent.” (In Note A of Lovelace (1842).)
Clearly she had some understanding of the idea of virtual machinery.
I don’t know whether she appreciated that such capabilities could also be linked up with
sensory and motor apparatus in a machine interacting with its environment.
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 Education for doing vs education for explaining and understanding
Computing education can serve many needs, including producing people who are good
at changing the world, to meet practical needs.
 But the equally important need to produce thinkers who can help us understand our
world, is not being served well by the almost exclusive emphasis on teaching about
applications of computing, and how to create them.
In part this is a result of the limited computational education that current computing teachers, and most
computing “experts” in academe and industry, have experienced in the last few decades.
NOTE: The opposite complaint used to be made (e.g. by The RSA http://www.thersa.org/)
a few decades ago: our educational system was not enough concerned with teaching people how to
make and do things: education was alleged to be too intellectual and not practical enough. We now
seem to be paying the price of the swing to the opposite extreme, at least in computing?
 Fred Brooks wrote that scientists build to understand and engineers understand to
build, and seemed to argue that there is no computer science, only computer
engineering (Brooks, 1996) http://www.cs.unc.edu/˜brooks/Toolsmith-CACM.pdf
But that ignores all the non-engineering work done by computer scientists,
including those trying to understand natural and artiﬁcial forms of computation.
Compare John McCarthy: “Towards a Mathematical Science of Computation” (IFIPS 1962)
http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/towards/towards.html
 A good education for the 21st century should include computation as science and
bring out the deep two-way connections between making models and understanding.
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Education on programming for understanding can start from attempts to
identify things various animals (including humans) can do, and then
introduce ways of attempting to replicate or model aspects of those
competences:
 Start with relatively simple competences and progress to increasingly complex ones
Competences that evolved later are not necessarily all harder to model, if we allow models that simplify.
For example, very few animals can play noughts and crosses (Tic-Tac-Toe), but it’s easier to get a
computer to play it than to do things that much older species do – including ants, termites,
nest-building birds and others. Could such a program think like a human? Do you know how you think?
 Try to identify and model different sorts of competence. If the tasks are too difﬁcult, at
least try to characterise what is difﬁcult about them and what would be needed to
model them. E.g.
1. Think about making machines that
– perceive things (using touch, smell, resistance to force, sound, vision, or other sensors)
– want things or want to be in certain states or want to avoid certain objects or states, so that they
produce or avoid behaviours in accordance with what the want
– have various ways of moving which they can control to achieve goals,
– can learn about the world they inhabit, including building explanatory theories, which they use in
planning or executing actions
– can be aware of their own states of mind,
– can understand a simple language and use it to think with or communicate with.
2. When you have your models working, consider how you could test whether they are good models of
how humans or other animals work? E.g. in which environments would they fail?
 This involves studying different mechanisms, architectures, representations, and more.
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Our educational system needs to produce more people who can think
deeply about such things:
It can’t be left to psychologists, neuroscientists, biologists, philosophers –
they need to be educated about natural and artiﬁcial varieties of computational
mechanisms – including ones we don’t understand yet.
Making progress is very hard:
but it helps if we think about the right questions,
many of which are unobvious – and cross disciplines.
So, how can we make progress?
I’ll illustrate questions to be asked, by giving examples of animal competences.
A long term collaborative project can extend the collection of examples, organise them, ﬁnd intermediate
examples, and search for explanatory mechanisms, with help from several disciplines.
A fruitful approach could consider transitions (competence changes) in these trajectories:
1. Evolutionary trajectories for a species, or succession of species;
2. Developmental and learning trajectories for an individual;
3. Social/Cultural trajectories for a community;
4. Trajectories for an ecosystem
Identifying observed, inferred, or conjectured transitions can help us get closer to
modelling “before” states, “after” states, or both.
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Now consider biological information processing
A vast amount has been learnt, in many different disciplines or sub-disciplines.
I’ll point to only some very general, relatively well known, ways in which organisms vary.
Some of the changes are impossible unless others have occurred ﬁrst: e.g. visual
perception of distant objects requires optical sensors.
The subdivisions I draw attention to are very coarse-grained: empirical research has
revealed and is likely to reveal many more more detailed sub-divisions.
For now a broad-brush picture will have to sufﬁce to characterise the variety of research
sub-goals that contribute to the overall goals of this meta-morphogenesis project
(explained more fully below).
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Toddler theorems:
Things you probably know – and children can learn:
 You can get new information about the contents
of a room from outside an open doorway
(a) if you move closer to the doorway,
(b) if you keep your distance but move sideways.
Why do those procedures work? How do they differ?
(Theory: visual information travels in straight lines.)
There’s lots more...
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Toddler theorems:
Things you probably know – and children can learn:
 You can get new information about the contents
of a room from outside an open doorway
(a) if you move closer to the doorway,
(b) if you keep your distance but move sideways.
Why do those procedures work? How do they differ?
(Theory: visual information travels in straight lines.)
 Why do perceived aspect-ratios of visible
objects change as you change your viewpoint?
A circle acquires an elliptical appearance, with changing
ratio of lengths of major/minor axes.
A rectangle appears like a parallelogram or a trapezium.
 Why do you see different parts of an object as you move round it?
 What happens to the information available to you if an object in front of you rotates?
 What happens to information available about an object
– If you place it inside an open box with the box facing upwards?
– If you then place that inside an open box with the box facing upwards?
– If you place an open box upside down over it?
– If you then place all the previous items inside a box open at the top? (Why try that?)
These are special cases of questions about affordances, which Gibson might have asked.
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Kinds of Causation: (Humean)
Two gear wheels attached to a box with hidden contents.
Can you tell by looking what will
happen to one wheel if you rotate
the other about its central axis?
 You can tell by experimenting: you may or may not discover a correlation – depending on what is inside
the box.
 In more complex cases there might be a knob or lever on the box, and you might discover a dependence:
the position of the knob or lever determines how the ﬁrst wheel’s rotation affects the second wheel’s
rotation.
(Compare learning about gears in driving a car.)
 In still more complex cases there may be various knobs and levers, modifying one another’s effects
through hidden mechanisms. There could also be motors turning things in different directions, competing
through friction devices, so that the fastest one wins.
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Kinds of Causation: 2 (Kantian)
Two more gear wheels:
You (and some children) can tell, by
looking, how rotation of one wheel will
affect the other.
How? You can simulate rotations and
observe the consequences.
(Making assumptions about the kind of stuff
the wheels are made of: rigid and
impenetrable)
What you can see includes this:
As a tooth near the centre of the picture moves up or down it will come into contact with a tooth from the
other wheel.
If the ﬁrst tooth continues moving, it will push the other in the same direction, causing its wheel to rotate.
(I am not claiming that children need to reason verbally like this, consciously or unconsciously.)
NB: The simulations that you run can make use of not just perceived shape, but also
unperceived constraints: in this case rigidity and impenetrability.
These need to be part of the perceiver’s ontology and integrated into the simulations, for the simulation to
be deterministic.
The constraints and processes using them need not be conscious, or expressed in linguistic or logical
form: how all this works remains to be explained.
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Kantian causal explanations
Reasoning that is used to predict what will be observed can also be used to explain what is
observed, if mechanisms are partly hidden.
A similar kind of reasoning can be used to
explain observed motion: e.g. if the left wheel is
moved as shown by the left arrow, why does the
right wheel move as shown by the right arrow?
There is no way to infer the correct explanation by
reasoning from what is observed,
But if an appropriate theory can be constructed, and
added as a “hidden premiss” (abductive reasoning) then it
can be tested by working out its consequences and
comparing them with what is observed.
Humean (nowadays Bayesian) causal reasoning based on statistical information about
perceived correlations, is the only kind of causal reasoning available when mechanisms
are not understood.
Kantian (structure-based, deterministic) causal reasoning is sometimes available, and is
often more useful, but it requires a richer ontology and more general reasoning abilities
that can make direct use of structural constraints in complex conﬁgurations.
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Perhaps the following conﬁguration could be used to test whether a child
had moved beyond the empirical understanding of gear-wheel interaction.
If wheel A moves as shown,
which way will wheels C and D turn?
This can test adults too!
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How can a child learn about ways of producing ordered structures, e.g.
arranging blocks in order of increasing or decreasing height?
Various stages
Partial successes and partial failures can trigger changes – but only if the right information
processing mechanisms for self-monitoring and debugging are available.
What’s involved in noticing
1. that you have made a mistake
2. that the mistake can be corrected
3. that there was information available at the time the mistake was made that could have
been used but was not used
4. that there is a way of proceeding in future that uses such information?
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See what you can learn by thinking about these two puzzles.
Take notes on what you do and what you learn and how you learn it.
Puzzle 1: A warm-up exercise:
Note that the ﬁrst question is about what is possible (a solution), and the second is about
what is impossible (a solution shorter than ....)
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Puzzle 2 Now stretch yourself:
Take notes on what you do and what you learn and how you learn it.
How people work on these puzzles varies according to prior knowledge and experience, and their ability to
deploy knowledge they already have.
Even mathematicians sometimes kick-themselves for failing to notice the simple, elegant solution that a child
could discover. (Though not all will.)
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Playing with a collection of cubes of the same size you can try forming
patterns with them.
Sometimes you’ll fail: Why?
How can a child become convinced that something is impossible?
There are very many more examples.
NB: don’t confuse learning about the ‘natural numbers’ with learning about
numerosity of perceived collections – a far shallower competence.
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applicable to different entities be acquired??
Number of discrete objects?
Length of a straight line?
Length of a curved line? (Arbitrary curves?)
Area of a rectangle?
Area of a shape not made up of rectangles. E.g. a circle?
Area of an arbitrary shape?
Volume of a cubic box?
Volume of a cylinder?
Volume of an arbitrary shape?
How many normal adults understand these concepts?
How many who don’t understand them have the ability to understand them?
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Lots more to be said.
How can you come to understand that it is possible for a moving object’s
speed to be decreasing while its acceleration is increasing?
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Non-epistemic affordances concerned with opening and shutting
micro-worlds:
 In order to shut a door, why do you sometimes need to push it, sometimes to pull it?
 Why do you need a handle to pull the door shut, but not to push it shut?
 How you could use the lid of one coffee tin to open the lid of another which you cannot
prise out using your ﬁngers?
 What happens if you shut an open drawer by pressing your hands over the top edge
and pushing?
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These slides are still incomplete.
A major collaborative, multi-disciplinary, project is required: for collecting
and organising changes in information process in organisms, and tracing
inﬂuences, identifying examples of convergent evolution, identifying
different trajectories leading to similar competences, identifying possible
mechanisms, testing theories by producing working implementations,
identifying etc.
Additional theory and examples can be found in other presentations and
discussions here:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/AREADME.html
Provisional references follow
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